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B. Pro-Axis Group.
2
1. Itagaki and his group; now War Minister.
2. Shiratori, Ambassador to Rome.
3. Oshima, Ambassador to Berlin.
4. General Masaki.
5. Kurihara, Director of Asiatic Bureau of the Foreign Office.
6. T. Kawai, spokesman of the Foreign Office.
7. K. Honda.
(?) 8. S. Araki, Minister of Education.
(?) 9. General Kois, Minister of Colonial Government.
C.-Neutral.
1. H. Yanagawa, head of the Koain, and his group.
2. Prince Konoye and his followers, ex-Premier of Government.
3. Some of the leading financiers :-
(a) S. Ikoda, adviser to the Government and representative of the
Mitsui.
(b) S. Go, adviser to the Government and representative of the
national industrial and commercial associations.
(c) H. Yuki, head of Japanese National Bank.
N.B. (a) Most of these leading financiers are pro-Britain.
(b) Prince Konoye is too famous for pro-American sentiment
II.-Differences of Opinion among the Army Leaders.
(a) General Minami and Terauchi group-
1. General Terauchi.
2. General Minami, Governor of Korea.
3. General Sugiyama.
4. Lieutenant-General Kita.
5. Major-General Nemoto.
6. Major-General Kagesa.
7. Colonel Imai, head of the China Bureau of the Army.
8. Major-General Buto.
(b) General Itagaki group—
1. Lieutenant-General Isogai,
2. Lieutenant-General Doihara.
3. Major-General Kaihaku.
4. Some of the important officers of the War Military.
(c) Neutral-
1. General Nishio.
2. Lieutenant-General Nakajima.
(d) Generals Araki and Masaki group—
1. General Araki,
2. General Masaki,
3. Lieutenant-General Yanakawa.
4. Major-General Machijiri, Director of Military Bureau of Army
Office.
5. Lieutenant-General Tojo, head of the Military Aviation Office.
(e) General Koiso group-
1. Lieutenant-General Ando, Commander-in-chief of the Japanese
troops in South China.
2. Major-General Hikuchi.
3. Colonel Iankuro.
4. Lieutenant-Colonel Toko.
(f) Three highest military officials—
1. Minister of War: Lieutenant-General Itagaki.
2. Director-General of Military Education: General Nishio.
3. Vice-Chief of General Staff: Lieutenant-General Nakajima.
3
(a) This group takes its name of Control from its determination to bring the whole army, especially the younger officers, under a unified control. This grew out of several occurrences by which small groups of subordinates took action committing the whole army and nation. It tends to be relatively moderate and conservative.
(b) These were originally younger officers in the Kwantung army, who created the Mukden incident and the Manchukuo régime. They are extremists in their China policy, pro-Axis, and are the supporters of Wang Ching-wei. They aim to effect the settlement in China along the general lines of Manchukuo. (d) This group are responsible for the fiasco of the 26th February, 1936, in which revolt they were overcome by the members of Group (a). Since then they have become somewhat independent and pro-democracies, and advocate direct negotiations with the National Government of China.
(e) Is a group which split away from (b), and is more or less in sympathy with (d). Rather unimportant.
(These three army chiefs virtually control the military policy of the
country.
These lists of political groupings have been supplied by a Chinese who has just returned from a visit to Tokyo, during which he had exceptional oppor- tunities for observing political trends. His impression of the economic situation as it affects hostilities in China is about as follows. The military leaders now in power representing in general the extremist viewpoint, are working for a type of totalitarian organisation which mobilises all national resources under unified governmental control, primarily directed towards continued military activity. In so far as they succeed they will probably be able to reduce the Japanese economy to such regimentation as will make possible continued warfare for some time. On the other hand, there is growing dissatisfaction with this tendency in a wide variety of groups which, from their varying standpoints, are unwilling to have their private ambitions or rights so completely crushed. The issue turns upon whether this human opposition will become sufficiently articulate, organised and courageous to neutralise the nationalisation of material wealth. This observer did not feel competent to express an opinion as to which of these would win, beyond stating that the human factor is becoming more active than appears on the surface.
Enclosure 3.
Notes by Military Attaché, Tokyo, on Personalities' Opinions.
I-A. Pro-Democracies Group—
This group, though not complete, is correct, though the actual descriptions of the titles are inaccurate in places. It should be noted that No. 9 is General K. Ugaki.
I-B. Pro-Axis Group—
Nos. 8 and 9, Generals Araki and Koiso, against whom question marks have been placed, should both be in the Pro-Democracies Group. As regards No. 1, Itagaki, he was against the Axis in the early part of 1939, but is believed to have modified his views somewhat in favour of the Axis. Since the conclusion of the Soviet-German pact he has probably reverted to his original view.
I-C.
Neutral
No. 3 (a), Ikeda, belongs to I-A, Pro-Democracies. II-C-
The blank opposite the question mark refers to the Vice-Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General Nakajima.
II-D-
General Araki is now quite independent, and though he has a large following cannot be grouped with General Masaki.
Generally speaking I agree with the summary and also with the grouping of the officers in Part II of the list.(') There is no doubt that the informer has got a lot of good information. I notice particularly Major-General Higuchi placed in General Koiso's group; very few people know this, but it is true.
(') Enclosure 2.
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